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Ignoring History: The Liability of 
Ships' Masters, Innkeepers and 
Stablekeepers Under Roman Law 
by DAVID S. BOGEN* 
Roman law is rarely taught in American law schools, although 
it has had an unequalled impact on the legal systems of the world. 
Contemporary issues dominate the elective curriculum-gender, race, 
the environment, and the impact of technological change together with 
responses to those problems in the legal clinic practice and jurisprudential 
theory. 1 But any attempt to deal with today's problems without an 
historical sense threatens to compound the errors of the past. Proposals 
to change or retain laws may be misdirected when they focus on 
contemporary justifications without considering history. Roman law 
illustrates some of the difficulties created by ignoring history, while 
it also provides perspective on the common law and examples for studies 
in legal reasoning. This paper deals with one small issue of Roman 
law that provides such an object lesson-the confusion and conflict 
in the Digest on the obligations of ships' masters, innkeepers, and 
stablekeepers. 
The preeminent source for our knowledge of Roman law is 
Justinian's Digest.2 It devoted two of its four hundred thirty-two titles 
to actions against ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers.J 
However, the provisions in those titles seem to conflict. One passage 
says that innkeepers and ships' masters are liable for the acts of their 
customers, but another passage says that they are not. One passage 
*Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, Md. Tony Weir 
commented on an earlier draft of this piece during a brief visit at Maryland, saving 
the author from untold mistakes, but he cannot be held responsible for those that remain. 
I have also profited from the advice of my colleagues Oscar Gray, Alan Hornstein, 
Mark Sargent, Ted Tomlinson and Gordon Young. Tracy Downing, Celeste Hunter 
Robinson and John Connolly served as research assistants. 
I. Even English legal history, the fount of the American legal system, receives only 
incidental mention in most of legal education. 
2. The Digest of Justinian, (4 vols.; translation edited by Alan Watson with Latin 
text edited by Theodor Mommsen with the aid of Paul Krueger; Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). Like Tribonian, Watson directed a group of scholars in 
this effort, and there are distinct differences in style among them. 
3. D. 4.9 and D. 47.5. Citations to Justinian's Digest are traditionally made with 
the abbreviation D. and the numbers of book, title, fragment, and paragraph. The first 
paragraph is the principium abbreviated pr., so § I is really the second paragraph. Other 
titles in the Digest also deal with ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers, but they 
either make only passing references (D.l9.2.13.1,2; D.l9.2.31; D.l9.5.1; D.44.7.5.6; 
47.2.14.17) or focus entirely on ships' masters (D.l4.1,2). 
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states that innkeepers must accept travelers while another says that 
innkeepers may choose whether to receive them. This article attempts 
to unravel these contradictions. It concludes that the lack of any 
authoritative rule on· the obligation of innkeepers to serve the public 
led to the inconsistent Digest statements. The confusion resulted from 
attempts to give reasons for the variety of legal rules on ships' masters, 
innkeepers and stablekeepers without considering the historical 
development of those rules. 
I. A Note on Historical Development 
Ronian law is the law of an entity that changes over a thousand 
year period from a small city ruled by a king to a growing republic 
to an empire surrounding the Mediterranean sea. The law also changed 
significantly, and some knowledge of its historical development is 
necessary to understand the conflict in the texts. 
The first record of Roman law is the Twelve Tables-a record 
of customary law from about 450 B. C. of which only fragments survive. 4 
Private citizens enforced obligations under this law by making a claim 
before the magistrate, or praetor, an official elected annually. The praetor 
decided whether the plaintiffs claim was in the correct form derived 
from the Twelve Tables and appointed the judge or judges to hear 
it. These actions pursuant to the promulgated law were called legis 
actiones.s Later statutes, such as the lex Aquilia of 286 B.C. which 
introduced a more comprehensive system of law on injury to property, 
also provided for enforcement by legis actiones.6 But decisions under 
the legis actiones became technical and lacked the flexibility to deal 
with new situations. During the second century B.C., the praetor was 
freed from the constraints of the legis actiones and issued his own form 
which framed the issue for the judge or iudex, who was bound by 
the terms of the praetor's formula. Ultimately, the praetor issued 
formulae for new causes of action and might even refuse to grant a 
formula for a statutorily based claim which he thought unfair.7 The 
praetor's behavior might be analogized to the English courts of Equity 
which did not challenge the validity of the common law, but developed 
new remedies which were unavailable at common law or enjoined persons 
from pursuing common law remedies. Unlike the English Equity court, 
the Roman praetor faced no competition for business from other courts 
and his decisions became central to Roman private law. 
4. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History 
(trans. J.M. Kelly, 2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 23. See 0.1.2.4. Book 
One of the Digest is on the Origin of Law. It provides some institutional history of 
Roman law, but provides little in the way of doctrine. 
5. The Institutes of Gaius (trans. W.M. Gordon and O.F. Robinson from Latin 
text of Seckel and Kuebler; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. 407 [IV.ll.]. 
6. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 31. See 0.9.2. 
7. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 85-91; Gaius, supra note 5 at 427 [IV:30]. 
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On taking office, praetors announced in an "edict" the principles 
of law they would follow. Although each praetor was bound to follow 
his own edict, the next praetor could promulgate a different rule. 
Nevertheless, successive praetors usually adopted most of the principles 
of their predecessors. Around 130 A.D., the Emperor Hadrian instructed 
Salvius Julianus to consolidate the edicts of the praetors into a single 
edict, which could be changed only by the emperor.s Although the 
original text of Julian's revision of the edict has been lost, Professor 
Otto Lenel reconstructed it. This reconstruction has been widely accepted 
despite criticism of some particulars.9 
The praetors rarely had legal training, but they could get advice 
from private individuals trained in the law. Litigants also could request 
advice from these jurists. Some of the jurists' responses eventually be-
came part of the Digest; for example, Alfenus reported responses of 
Servius Sulpicius Rufus in the first century B.C.JO By that time, the 
jurists not only responded to actual cases, but created and discussed 
hypotheticals as well. 11 Developing out of this tradition, jurists began 
to write extensive commentaries on the interpretation and application 
of the laws. By the beginning of the third century A.D., Ulpian and 
others wrote commentaries that included extensive references to the 
work of previous jurists. Such commentary became particularly useful 
as the Roman legal system became an imperial bureaucracy. 
The two-stage proceeding of obtaining a formula from the praetor 
which told the judge what issues to decide was gradually replaced by 
the cognitio, a unitary procedural system in which the magistrate heard 
the whole case. Despite changes in procedure and new laws promulgated 
by the Emperor, the commentaries from earlier periods remained 
essential expositions of the law's substance. Multiple copies of the most 
popular works were made by scribes. They were consulted by government 
officials and studied in schools. These commentaries were not historical 
curiosities, but living guides that needed constant revision. Like 
subsequent editions of Blackstone, Kent, Story and Williston where 
the original author's name becomes part of the title and the later editors 
get little recognition, new editions of the classical Roman jurists gave 
8. R.W. Leage, Roman Private Law (3d ed. A.M. Prichard; New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1967) pp. 21-30. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 90-94. The date of 131 A.D. is often 
given for Julian's completion of the edict, but Honore suggests that it is an open question. 
Tony Honore, Gaius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) pp. 54-55. 
9. Otto Lenel, Das £dictum Perpetuum (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1927). Lenel's 
reconstruction contained at least 292 entries. For an English translation of the Perpetual 
Edict, see Ancient Roman Statutes (trans. Allan Chester Johnson, Paul Robinson 
Coleman-Norton, Frank Card Bourne; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961) pp. 183-
95. 
10. 0.19.2.31. 
II. See Bruce W. Frier, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985). 
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little credit to the later editors (who may not have completely understood 
the original author). Users might add notes or revisions on the original 
papyrus, which might in turn be copied as part of the manuscript with 
no indication that they were not part of the original. Additions to and 
alterations of the original text are called "interpolations. "12 These texts 
from the classical era as they passed through 300 years of anonymous 
revision were the primary authorities excerpted in the Digest. 
In 530 A.D., the Emperor Justinian commanded his quaestor 
Tribonian and other legal scholars under Tribonian's direction to compile 
in fifty short books a single work out of the writings of ancient 
authorities.B The scholars were directed to excerpt the old works to 
eliminate repetition, obsolete discussion, and inconsistency. They were 
to correct mistakes of the authorities and improve their expression. 14 
They completed their task in 3 years, condensing more than 3,000,000 
lines into a work of 150,000 lines.'5 The fifty books of the Digest were 
subdivided into titles for each subject treated. Within each title, the 
compilers placed fragments from various authors with inscriptions 
naming the author and the book where the statements had been found.t6 
Justinian then commanded that this Digest have the force of law. Any 
texts not contained in the Digest could not be offered in argument 
in court. Ultimately nearly all the works of the old authorities on Roman 
12. See H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (2d 
ed., Cambridge: University Press, 1954 reprinted 1961) p. 497-98; Fritz Schulz, History 
of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) p. 142; and Kunkel, supra 
note 4 at 137. Severe internal and external crises wracked the empire for much of the 
third century A.D., ending in an absolute monarchy. In 395 A.D., the empire was divided 
into the Eastern Roman empire and the Western empire. The Western empire where 
Latin remained the dominant language moved away from the classical system of Roman 
law which prevailed in the beginning of the third century A.D. The classical law was 
preserved in the east where the law schools flourished, but Greek was the language of 
the Eastern empire. The two empires were united once more under Justinian, only to 
dissolve upon his death. Max Kaser, Roman Private Law (trans. Rolf Dannenbring, 
2d ed. Durban: Butterworths, 1968) pp. 3-5. 
13. A book originally was a scroll. The book with a spine and pages came into 
general use in the third century A.D. Justinian's Institutes (trans. Peter Birks & Grant 
McLeod with Latin text of Paul Krueger; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) p. 
9. Most of the ancient authorities were classical jurists who wrote in the late second 
and early third century. Their books would often have been scrolls of limited length. 
But the length of books with pages also remained limited for many years-the Digest 
books averaged about three thousand lines each which is 37.5 printed pages in the Watson 
edition. In effect, the book was a unit of length in ancient Rome, so Tribonian knew 
just how much he would have to condense the material when Justinian told him that 
the Digest was to be in fifty books. 
14. I Watson, supra note 2 at xlvi-xlix. The scholars were Tribonian, Constantinus, 
Theophilus, Dorotheus, Anatolius and Cratinus. They were assisted by eleven named 
barristers who also acted as counsel in cases heard before the court in the east. Justinian, 
De Confirmatione Digestorum in Watson, supra at lviii-lix. 
15. ld. at lvi. 
16. /d. at lix. 
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law have been lost, and only those selections excerpted in the Digest 
have survived. 
II. The Conflict in the Digest Texts 
Justinian, in his confirmation of the Digest, claimed that it had 
no inconsistencies . 
. As for any contradiction occurring in this book, none such has found a place 
for itself, and none will be discovered by anyone who reflects acutely upon 
the modes of diversity. On the contrary, something will be found, even if 
obscurely expressed, which removes the objection of inconsistency, gives the · 
matter a different aspect, and passes outside the limits of discrepancy.l 7 
Despite this claim, the Digest contains a number of in-
consistent passages, including those found in the two separate 
titles of the Digest on the liability of nautae, caupones et stabularii 
for losses suffered by their customers. "Nautae" are ships; masters.IB 
17. /d. at !xi. 
. 18. The translation of "nautae" reveals the difficulties in dealing with another 
language. There is simply no adequate way to translate nautae in this context. Literally, 
it means seamen. But the praetor, the official who issues the edit, made it clear that 
a special definition was involved. "The praetor says: 'seamen.' We ought to understand 
a seaman to be one who manages the ship, although all are called seamen who are 
in the ship in order to sail it. But the praetor is thinking on.ly of the person in charge." 
0.4.9.1.2. Geoffrey McCormack, the translator of D.4 in the Watson edition quoted 
above, rendered nauta literally as "seaman,'qeaving it in quotes whenever nautareferred 
to the special definition above. Unfortunately, "seaman" would lose the sense of vicarious 
liability if used in an extended article like this one. 
The special definition for nauta in 0.4.9.1.2 says the nauta is one who manages 
the ship (qui navem exercet) and that the praetor is thinking only of the person in 
charge (de exercitore). There are two candidates for that position-the magister navis 
and the exercitor-but neither one alone is satisfactory. Nautae probably includes both 
of them together, depending on the structure of authority on the particular trip. 
The magister navis is the person in physical charge of the vessel. The exercitor 
is "the maritime entrepreneur, the person with the prime economic interest in the ship's 
operations, the man who gives orders to the captain." I Watson, supra at 415. Tony 
Weir, translator of D.l4, renders exercitor as "shipowner" while explaining that there 
is no precise English equivalent for the Latin term, since the exercitor may not in 
fact be the owner of the ship. '"Shipowner' in this connection designates the person 
to whom all the income and revenues come, even if he does not actually own the 
ship: He may have hired it from the owner for a lump sum or for a fixed term or 
without limit of time." D.l4.1.1.15. 
A separate title of the Digest is devoted to the liability of the exercitor. 0.14.1. 
As the person who appoints the magister navis, the exercitor is liable for the agreements 
of the captain within the scope of the authority he gave the captain. D.l4.1.1.7. The 
exercitor is also liable for the delicts of the crew on board. D.l4.1.1.2. But the Digest 
did not limit liability in D.4.9 or D.47.5 to the exercitor. After all, the liability of 
the exercitor derives from the magister navis. An action against one bars an action 
against the other. D.l4.1.1.24. Furthermore, it is the magister navis who sues and 
is sued under the Rhodian law of jettison when cargo is jettisoned to save the ship. 
D.14.2.2pr. Finally, the definitions of innkeeper and stablekeeper in 0.4.9 state that 
they comprise both those who carry on (exercent) the business of an inn or stable 
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"Caupones" are innkeepers. "Stabularii" are stablekeepers.I9 
"Let Seamen, Innkeepers, and Stab1ekeepers Restore What They 
Have Received" is the caption for title 9 of Digest book 4. The first 
fragment under that title establishes the strict liability of ships' masters, 
innkeepers and stablekeepers for any damage or loss of their customers' 
goods.2o The ship's master is liable for damage or loss resulting from 
the acts of the passengers. "[H]e receives for safekeeping all the goods 
which have been brought onto the ship and ... he ought to be liable 
for the acts not only of the crew but also of the passengers. ''21 The 
succeeding fragment adds, "just as an innkeeper is liable for the acts 
of travelers. ''22 
D.4.9.l.l, the "operator's choice" paragraph, states in part that 
and their managers. D.4.9.1.5. The parallel liability of the nautae, caupones and stabularii 
suggests a parallel interpretation of the status of persons covered by the terms. Thus, 
nauta in both D.4.9 and D.47.5 should be read to include both the exercitor and 
the magister navis. 
J.A.C. Thomas translated nauta as "ship's master" in the title of 0.47.5. "Ship's 
master" is the literal translation of magister navis, but the nauta is not just the magister 
navis. Most of the specific references to liability in D.47.5 specify the exercitor navis 
rather than the magister navis. Further, nauta must refer to someone other than the 
magister navis in D.4.9 because a fragment states that the nauta should only be placed 
under an obligation "through his own act or that of the master of the ship." D.4.9.1.2 
(emphasis supplied). 
Despite problems, this article translates nauta as "ship's master" to indicate the 
person or persons with effective charge of the ship. To avoid confusion, where not 
quoting another's translation, the article refers to the magister navis as the "captain" 
of the ship. Translating magister navis as "captain" is intended to convey the idea 
that "ship's master" is a broader term that refers to both the captain (magister navis) 
and to the shipowner (exercitor) where the captain acts within his authority. 
19. Stabulum carried the dual meaning of stable and inn. The word may have begun 
as an inn with a stable, but it lost that restrictive meaning. Ti:innes Kleberg, Hotels, Restaurants 
et Cabarets dans L'Antiquite Romaine: Etudes historiques et philologiques (Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksells, 1957) pp. 18-19. See also Cassell's Latin Dictionary: Latin-English 
and English-Latin, S. V. "Stabulum." "Stabu/ari1~ was variously translated as stable keepers, 
liverymen and innkeepers in Watson, supra note 2. "Stabularius"in D.3.2.4.2 was translated 
as a keeper of a tavern. Watson, supra note 2 at 83. Other authors also refer to stabularius 
as an innkeeper. W.C. Firebaugh, The Inns of Greece & Rome: And a History of Hospitality 
from the Dawn of Time to the Middle Ages (Chicago: Pascal Covici, 1928) 119. D.4.9.5pr 
speaks of the stabularius receiving payment on account of beasts Uumentum) staying with 
him. Kleberg cites Digest 4.9.5 as an example of the use of stabularius as a keeper of 
an inn with stables. Kleberg, supra at 28. Nevertheless, the Digest chapters on liability 
of nautae, caupones et stabularii, D.4.9 and D. 47.5, translate stabu/arii as stablekeepers 
or liverymen. This seems the better translation in focusing on the stable in contrast to 
the caupones who operate inns. Much of the same rationale for holding the operator liable 
for lost property applies regardless whether the stables are part of the inn or have an 
independent identity. 
20. D.4.9.1 pr. See also D. 4.9.3.1. 
21. D.4.9.1.8. See also D.4.9.3pr. 
22. D.4.9.2. 
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this strict liability is not too harsh because these businesses decide 
whom they will take. 
The praetor says: "I will give an action against seamen, innkeepers, 
and stablekeepers in respect of what they have received and undertaken to 
keep safe, unless they restore it." This edict is of the greatest benefit, because 
it is necessary generally to trust these persons and deliver property into their 
custody. Let no one think that the obligation placed on them is too strict; 
for it is in their own discretion whether to receive anyone.23 
One of the puzzles of this passage is the failure of the explanation 
to explain. The discretion of the operator of a business to refuse 
customers doesn't significantly mitigate the severity of the liability. 
Innkeepers and ships' masters often knew very little about the travelers 
who asked for their services.24 Choice in such constrained 
circumstances is not meaningful and provides no foundation for 
arguing that the liability is not too strict for the businessman. 
The mystery of this explanation is compounded by another Digest 
section which denies both the innkeeper's right to refuse customers 
and his liability for their behavior. Title 5 of book 47 of the Digest, 
captioned "The Action for Theft Against Ships' Masters, Innkeepers, 
and Liverymen," sets forth the liability of those persons for theft 
committed by their employees, stating that the action is for twofold.25 
But ships' masters are not liable for the behavior of their passengers. 
D.47.5.1.6, the "innkeeper's duty" paragraph, states that innkeepers 
are liable for thefts committed by their permanent lodgers, but not 
for theft by travelers because they cannot exclude the latter. 
The innkeeper is answerable for the deeds of those whom he has in 
the inn to run the establishment as also of those who reside in the inn; 
he is not answerable for the acts of passing travelers. For an innkeeper 
or liveryman is not regarded as choosing his own traveler and cannot refuse 
those making a journey; but in a way, the innkeeper does select his permanent 
residents, since he does not reject them, and so should be answerable for 
what they do. In the case of a ship, there is no liability for the acts of 
passengers.26 
Once more the explanation makes no sense. The distinction 
between the traveler and the lodger purportedly shows that the 
innkeeper is at fault for thefts committed by a long term lodger and 
not for those committed by the traveler. But the ship's master is not 
liable for the acts of his passengers although there is no indication 
he is bound to accept them. Further, fault is a poor explanation for 
double damages, because the employer may have no inkling of the 
23. (emphasis supplied) 0.4.9.1 pr. 
24. 0.14.1.1 pr. If the traveler knew little about the character of the ship's master 
because of the need for haste in making arrangements, the same was likely to be 
true of the master's knowledge of the traveler. 
25. 0.47.5.lpr,2,6. 
26. (emphasis supplied) 0.47.5.1.6. 
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character defect of his employees or his permanent lodgers. Finally 
, the liability is aberrational, for employers in other businesses do 
not have to pay double damages for thefts committed by their 
employees. Thus, the distinction between the types of customers the 
innkeeper must shelter and those he may refuse does not explain the 
imposition of double damages. 
In short, the "operator's choice" paragraph and the "innkeeper's 
duty" paragraph conflict on the innkeeper's duty to serve the traveler; 
they do not justify the liability rules they purportedly explain; and 
those liability rules themselves appear inconsistent. The remainder 
of this paper attempts to explain the apparent inconsistency in liability 
rules, the weaknesses of the explanations for those rules and the conflict 
in statements on the innkeeper's duty to accept travelers. 
The search for answers to these puzzles leads from the Digest 
texts through the historical development of Roman law, the 
methodology of the compilers, and the analysis of interpolations which 
change the original texts. 
III. The Different Rules on Liability for Customer Losses-
Actio Furti Adversus Nautae Caupones Stabularii 
and Actio de Recepto 
The first puzzle posed by the two titles on the liability of ships' 
masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers is why the texts contain different 
conditions of liability for customer losses-some saying they are liable 
to their customers for thefts committed by other customers while other 
passages state they are not liable for the misbehavior of their customers. 
The simplest explanation is that the texts refer to different actions. 
Confusion arises because characteristics from one action are 
included in a title of the Digest apparently devoted to the other. The 
solution of this difficulty requires an excursion into the working 
methodology of the compilers and a discussion of the problems posed 
by the existence of yet a third action which had no separate title, 
the actio damni adversus nautas caupones et stabularios [actio damni 
a.n.c.s.], an action for damages to goods. 
A. Textual Differences Refer to Separate Actions 
Most scholars agree that there are at least two separate actions-
the actio furti adversus nautae caupones stabularios [hereinafter actio 
furti a.n.c.s.] and the actio de recepto-applicable to the liability of 
ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers for losses suffered by 
their customers.27 This theory reconciles the conflicting liability rules, 
although it does not resolve whether innkeepers could refuse patrons. 
27. Ferdinand M ackeldey, Handbook of the Roman Law (trans. Moses A. Dropsie; 
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For the most part, the actions are found in different books of 
the Digest, dealing with very different concepts. Book 47 deals 
primarily with civil wrongs like theft, arson, swindling, defamation 
and robbery where the victim was often entitled to a twofold or fourfold 
recovery. The actio furti a.n.c.s. is described in title 5 of that book. 
It was quasi-delictual and permitted a twofold recovery. The victim 
must prove that the goods were stolen by the operator of the business, 
his employee, or, in the case of the inn, by a long term lodger. The 
justification offered emphasized the fault of the operator of the business 
in selecting dishonest employees, but the employee's dishonesty was 
conclusive proof of the employer's fault. 
On the other hand, book 4 of the Digest deals largely with 
restitution. 28 The first several fragments of Title 9 of that book describe 
the actio de recepto. That action is more contractual in nature and 
recovery is limited to the value of the goods lost or the amount by 
which they were damaged. The action was for failure to restore what 
had been received. The victim could recover from the operator of 
the business for loss even if the goods were stolen by a fellow passenger 
or traveler; indeed, the victim could recover ·without knowing how 
the goods were lost. Such strict liability could not be justified by 
any demonstrated fault of the defendant, but it protected against any 
possibility of dishonest operators. 
Thus, the ship's master, the innkeeper or the stablekeeper were 
liable for damages in the actio de recepto for the acts of a customer 
which harmed another customer's goods, but they were not liable 
to pay the double damages of the actio furti a.n.c.s. for such acts. 
B. The Parallel to Related Actions: The Actio Furti and the 
Condictio Furtiva 
The perpetrator of a theft also faced two separate actions with 
different contours which applied to the same event. The general action 
against the thief was called the actio furti. It can be traced to the 
Twelve Tables. "The code, so far as can be seen, was in very large 
Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1883) p. 361, 378; Rudolph Sohm, The Institutes: 
History and System of Roman Private Law (3d ed.; trans. James Crawford Ledlie; Oxford: 
Clarendon,Press, 1907 reprinted 1970 by Augustus M. Ketley, New York) p. 411; Paul 
Huvelin, Etudes D'Histoire du Droit Commercial Romain (Paris: Librarie du Recueil 
Sirey, 1929) pp. 115 et seq.; W.W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law (2d 
ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939 reprinted 1957) pp. 309, 332; J.A. Crook, 
Law and life of Rome (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1967) pp. 226-28; R.W. Leage, 
supra note 8 at 381, 422; Max Kaser, supra note 12 at 197-98. 
28. This is not restitution in a technical sense of the word, but deals with nullifying 
an intervening event-"For under this head, the praetor helps men on many occasions 
who have made a mistake or been cheated, whether they have incurred loss through 
duress or cunning or their youth or absence." 0.4.1.1. 
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measure based on the idea of the right of an injured party to private 
vengeance. "29 If the thief was not caught in the act, the victim could 
obtain a monetary penalty, usually set at double damages.3° Under the 
Twelve Tables, if the victim caught the thief in the act, he could bring 
the thief before a magistrate who would hand the thief into the power 
of the victim to enslave or sell into slavery to foreigners.3 1 Sometime 
around the third century B.C., the penalty for manifest theft in the Twelve 
Tables was modified by the praetor's edict.32 "[1]he severity of this penalty 
was disapproved and an action for fourfold damages was created in 
the praetor's Edict. "33 Perhaps also the edict reflected a common practice 
by victims of accepting a ransom instead of killing or enslaving the 
thief.34 
The actio furti with its twofold or fourfold damages lay only against 
the thief and not his heirs. Further, multiple damages were of little effect 
against a poor defendant. The owner would normally be satisfied with 
return of the property. Indeed, the Twelve Tables provided that the 
stolen property belonged to the owner, so the owner could recover it 
in addition to collecting the multiple damages.35 The action for 
determination that the property belonged to the owner (vindicatio) was 
29. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 27. 
30. /d. at 28. "When anyone accuses and convicts another of theft which is not manifest, 
and no stolen property is found, judgment shall be rendered to compel the thief to pay 
double the value of what was stolen." Law 8 of Table II of the Twelve Tables, translated 
in Samuel Parsons Scott, Corpus Juris Civilis: The Civil Law, Vol. I (17 vols., Cincinnati: 
The Central Trust Company, 1932, reprinted New York: AMS Press, 1973) p. 62. "For 
non-manifest theft the Twelve Tables appointed a penalty of double damages, and this 
the praetor still retains." The Institutes of Gaius, supra note 5 at 377 [Book III, 190]. 
31. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 28. The Twelve Tables permit killing for manifest theft 
where the theft is committed at night (Table II, Law IV), where the thieves attempt to 
defend themselves (Table II, Law VI), or where the thief is a slave (Table II, Law V); 
otherwise they provide that thieves be given to the victim as slaves (Table II, Law V). 
See Table II of the Twelve Tables, translated in I Scott, supra note 30 at 58-62. Gaius 
wrote that "For manifest theft the penalty under the Twelve Tables was capital." Gaius, 
supra note 5 at 375 [III, 189]. Kunkel said that the victim of manifest theft could kill 
the thief after the magistrate handed the thief over to him. Zulueta said, however, that 
"poena capitalis" in Gaius here implied merely loss of status. Francis de Zulueta, The 
Institutes of Gaius: Part II Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953 reprinted 1963) 
p. 201. 
32. J.M. Kelly, Roman litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) p. 161. 
33. Gaius, supra note 5 at 375-77 [III, 189]. Professor Kelly suggested that the 
distinction in furtum between manifestum and nee manifestum was based on the strength 
of the proof which explained the difference in penalty. Kelly, supra note 32 at 141-44. 
Alternatively, he speculated that quadruple damages were reserved for offenses where 
the law had been ineffectual-and that furtum manifestum was either theft committed 
in daylight by groups so powerful that they would not submit to law or at night by 
thieves devoid of assets. /d. at 161-3. 
34. Leage, supra note 8 at 405. 
35. Twelve Tables, Table II, Law XI, "Stolen property shall always be his to whom 
it formerly belonged." Scott, supra note 30 at 62. 
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supplanted by a new action for the value of the property derived from 
a more general restitutionary type of action. "By the first century B.C., 
and probably earlier, the condiction became available in cases of outright 
theft, provided the owner could express his claim as a claim for a certain 
sum, quantity or thing,''36 The owner could sue the thief in a condictio 
furtiva for the value of the stolen property.37 This was not a delict, 
but a quasi-contractual action serving to prevent unjust enrichment. 
The condictio furtiva lay against the thiers heirs to prevent them from 
profiting from his wrong. 
In sum, the victim of a theft had two options for redress against 
the wrongdoer: an action for double damages for theft, the actio furti, 38 
and a separate action similar to restitution to recover the value of the 
item stolen, the condictio furtiva. If the property belonged to the customer 
of a ship's master, innkeeper or stablekeeper, the customer could also 
choose between two different actions against the operator of the premises: 
the actio furti a.n.c.s. with its double damages or the actio de recepto 
for the value of the item which was not restored. These actions forced 
the operator to seek reimbursement by bringing the actio furti or 
condictio furtiva against the thief. 
C. The Placement of Sections Relating to Furti in the Title Devoted 
to Actio de Recepto 
Most of the confusion over the existence of separate actions arises 
from the compilers' failure to keep them separated. 0.47.5 (the Theft 
title) is captioned "The Action for Theft Against Ships' Masters, 
Innkeepers and Liverymen" and is devoted to the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
0.4.9 (the Restoration title) is captioned "Let Seamen, Innkeepers and 
Stablekeepers Restore What They Have Received," and it discusses the 
actio de recepto. Nevertheless, at least two fragments in the Restoration 
title, fragments 6 and 7, refer to the actio furti a.n.c.s. Indeed, despite 
Justinian's caution against repetition, virtually every issue discussed in 
the Theft title is contained in the last two fragments of the Restoration 
title.39 The major difference is that fragments 6 and 7 in the Restoration 
36. John P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1951) p. 43. 
37. Leage, supra note 8 at 384-86. The owner could also bring a vindicatio where 
the stolen property was found. The vindicatio was the older action, but it required the 
plaintiff to find and seize the property in question and bring it before the court. The 
condictio probably initially developed to deal with fungible property such as money 
where the exact property could not be determined, and it was brought to recover the 
value of the item. Although in theory all three actions were available to an owner whose 
property was stolen, the return of the property would satisfy both vindicatio and condictio. 
The greater ease in bringing this action led to its ultimate extension to situations where 
the goods were unique. Ultimately, it supplanted the vindicatio. 
38. Justinian's Institutes, supra note 13 at 129 [Book IV, Title V, §3]. 
39. 47.5.pr,l is found in D.4.9.7pr, 0.47.5.2 in 0.4.9.7.1, 0.47.5.3 in 0.4.9.6.4, 
0.47.5.5 in 0.4.9.7.4, and 0.47.5.6 in 0.4.9.6.3. 0.47.5.4 is the only portion of 47.5 
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title refer to both damage and theft, but the Theft title covers only 
theft. Filing fragments 6 and 7 in the Restoration title produces a direct 
conflict within the same title.4o Fragment 2 says "an innkeeper is liable 
for the acts of travelers,"41 but paragraph 3 of fragment 6 states that 
the innkeepers' liability for the behavior of those living in the inn does 
not apply "to one who is received as a passing guest, such as a traveler. ''42 
The repetitious nature and confusing placement of fragments 6 and 
7 resulted from difficulties in classifying the action for damages, problems 
created by the compilers' methodology, and a lapse in judgment or 
concentration. 
1. The Actio Damni A.N.C.S. 
Although the strict liability of the actio de recepto covered damage 
as well as loss, the double damages of the quasi-delictual actio furti 
a.n.c.s. applied only to the theft of the goods of a customer. (Furtum 
is Latin for theft.) The actio damni a.n.c.s. was the quasi-delictual action 
when the defendant's employee damaged a customer's goods. 
Lenel thought that there was an edict for the actio damni a.n.c.s., 
and that it followed immediately after the edict on the lex Aquilia 
in Julian's Edict.43 He pointed to book 18 of Ulpian's On the Edict, 
which discussed the actio damni a.n.c.s. in connection with the lex Aqui/ia 
and harm to another's personal property. Unlike Ulpian, however, the 
Digest compilers chose not to discuss the actio damni a.n.c.s. in 
connection with material dealing with the lex Aqui/ia and harm to 
property, topics they dealt with in book 9 of the Digest. 44 They apparently 
· thought the actio damni a.n.c.s. was more closely related to the other 
praetorial actions against ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers. 
Huvelin contended that there was no separate edict for the actio 
damni a.n.c.s. in Julian's time, because the Digest does not give it a 
that deals with the receptum, pointing out that where the receptum lies, the nauta should 
have the suit for furti against the thief. That point is also made in 0.4.9.4pr. 
40. There may be enough of a transition so that the reader understands different 
actions are meant. Paragraph I of fragment 6 begins with the example of the operator 
of a ship or an inn who employs a slave owned by another. It poses the hypothetical 
of damage or theft by the slave of his owner's goods. Although the action for theft-
furtum-or an action for damages-damnum-would normally lie against the slave's 
owner noxally, the operator is liable to the owner for the wrong done him by his own 
slave because it is an action in factum. Perhaps the specific reference to theft and damage 
is sufficient to indicate that the remaining discussion is addressing the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
and not the receptum. 
41. 0.4.9.2. 
42. 0.4.9.6.3. 
43. Lenel, supra note 9 at 205 [§78]. 
44. 0.9.1.1; 0.9.2.1,3,5,7,"9,11,13,15,17,21,23,25,27,29,35. See 0.9.4.2,6,14; 0.4.9.7; 
0.47.10.25; 0.47.12.2; 0.48.8.10 which relate to such harms. 
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separate title.45 Huvelin argued that the actio damni a.n.c.s. was patterned 
on the formula associated with the actiofurti a.n.c.s., noting that Ulpian 
added references to theft when discussing the liability of the nauta for 
damage to goods.46 The close relationship of the actio damni a.n.c.s. 
and the actio furti a.n.c.s. does not prove the actio damni was n.ot 
a separate edict, for it is possible that the compilers simply believed 
that amalgamating the discussion of the actio damni a.n.c.s. with other 
actions in one title would help condense the material. 
While Ulpian discussed the actio damni a.n.c.s. and the actio furti 
a.n.c.s. together in book 18 on damages to personal property, he discussed 
the actio furti a.n.c.s. alone in book 38 which dealt largely with edicts 
involving theft. Ulpian's book 38 was a major source for Digest book 
47, and the excerpts on the actio furti a.n.c.s. from that book of Ulpian 
became the Theft title of the Digest.47 The problem is to explain why 
the compilers chose to place the fragments from Ulpian's book 18 which 
combined the discussion of the actio damni a.n.c.s. with the actio furti 
a.n.c.s. in a title devoted to the actio de· recepto. That explanation 
involves a short excursion into the method used in compiling the Digest. 
2. The Methodology of the Compilers 
Tribonian divided the compilers into three committees. On the basis 
of the first works which each committee read and excerpted, the 
committees have subsequently been called the Sabinian, edictal and 
Papinian committees.48 Working with Alan Rodger, Professor Tony 
Honore constructed a theory of the editorial process by which the 
45. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 128. 
46. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 127-35. 
47. D.47.2.53,93; D.47.4.1; D.47.5; D.47.6.1,3; D.47.7.7. See D.l3.1.6,10,12; 
D.39.4.12. 
48. The theory of three subcommittees was proposed by F. B1uhme in "Die Ordnung 
der Fragmente in den Pandektentite1n," 4 Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft 
256-474 (1818), reprinted in 6 Labeo 50 (1960). He observed that excerpts from distinct 
groups of classical writings tended to stand side by side within the individual Digest 
titles. These groups or "masses" appeared in a regular sequence in the titles, although 
the sequence began with different groups in different titles. 
"It is as if the titles were hands of cards in which, so far as five cards out 
of every six were concerned, the player, when he looked at his cards, found 
that they were arranged in suits and, within each suit, in numerical order, 
but that in some hands hearts came first, in others spades and so on. Bluhme 
interpreted the 'suits' as masses and, within each suit, the numerical order 
as the order in which the commissioners were to read the works assigned 
to them." · 
Tony Honore, Tribonian (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1978) p. 150. Bluhme's 
theory is generally accepted. J olowicz, supra note 12 at 493; Kunkel, supra note 4 at 
169-70; Leage, supra note 8 at 54; J.A.C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam 
and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976) p. 58. 
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excerpts were compiled into the books of the Digest. He said that each 
committee had two commissioners and a number of other personnel 
(barristers) attached to it, and he even offered a theory to identify which 
scholar was on which committee and what books each read.49 
Each scholar was assigned particular books to read and excerpt. 
Honore postulated that at the initial stage of excerpting, the two 
commissioners in each committee read and excerpted in groups of 
material, dividing each group into equal lots between them. The junior 
member handed his excerpts from each lot to the senior member who 
would file and distribute them in titles. If the senior member received 
them before completing work on his own lot, he might intersperse the 
excerpts of the junior member with his own.so Honore suggests that 
each excerpt was on a separate piece of papyrus and they were stacked 
on top of one another, so the mass for a given title consisted of a 
pile of fragments with the first text on the bottom and the last text 
on the top as it was added.51 The excerpts from all the committees 
on each title were stacked together, and all the titles in a book were 
given to a committee to edit. Each committee edited about a third 
of the books-Honore believed that the work was done in alternative 
series, e.g. the Sabinian Committee edited books 1,4,7,10 etc.s2 When 
this task was completed, the commission sat together to review the 
entire work as a whole.sJ 
The misflling of fragments 6 and 7 began in the initial excerpting 
process when two committees flied material dealing with the same subject 
matter under different titles. The books the Sabinian Committee read 
and excerpted dealt with the actio furti a.n.c.s. and not with any other 
actions against the nautae, caupones and stabularii. The Sabinian 
Committee put the fragment on the actio furti a.n.c.s. in the Theft 
title, D.47.5.54 The Edictal Committee read and excerpted fragments 
which dealt with a variety of actions against the nautae, caupones and 
49. Honore, Tribonian, supra note 48 at 146-86. Honore's theory on subdividing 
the readings was attacked in Douglas J. Osler, "The Compilation of Justinian's Digest," 
102 Zeitschriji der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistche Abteilung 129-
84 ( 1985). His theory on the identity of the committee members was criticized in David 
Pugsley, "Some Reflections on the Completion of Justinian's Digest," 19 Irish Jurist 
350 (1984). 
50. Honore, Tribonian, supra note 48 at 156. 
51. /d. at 175-76. 
52. /d. at 180. 
53. /d. at 185-86. 
54. If Honore is correct, Tribonian himself read and excerpted Ulpian, Edict books 
28 and 38 as well as Gaius, Golden Words, book 3 which either are the source of the 
double penalty discussion [Ulpian book 38 in D.47.5] or refer to liability for seamen's 
wrongs as in the section on exercitores (Ulpian book 28 in D.l4.1.1] or comparison 
to an item falling from an upper story [Gaius book 3 in D.44.7.5.6]. Honore, Tribonian, 
supra note 48 at 258, 261. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 340 1992
340 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XXXVI 
stabularii-the actio de recepto, the actio damni a.n.c.s. and the actio 
furti a.n.c.s.-and it filed them all together in the Restoration title, 
D.4.9. The Edictal Committee's decision to file all the references to 
actions against the ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers under 
the same title followed from its methodology and the particular content 
of the passages excerpted. 
If Honore is correct, Theophilus, the senior member of the Edictal 
Committee, excerpted the first five fragments of title 9 of book 4, the 
passages dealing with the actio de recepto. They were excerpted from 
three books which dealt generally with what this paper has called the 
restitutionary recovery.ss 
Several fragments on the actio de recepto which Theophilus 
excerpted mentioned theft, but they were not concerned with the actio 
furti a.n.c.s.s6 Shipwreck was an exception to liability under the actio 
de recepto,s7 and theft was the likely explanation for goods lost aboard 
ship in any other way. The person liable for safekeeping was liable 
under the actio de recepto for stolen goods even if no one could identify 
the thief. The last paragraph of fragment three discussed the relationship 
between the praetorian action on the actio de recepto and the action 
for theft.Ss As fragment four, Theophilus added a section from Paul 
arguing that the nauta should be able to sue the perpetrator for theft 
because the nauta bore the risk. Paul then stated that the risk included 
55. Ulpian, Edict, book 14; Gaius, Provincial Edict, book 5; and Paul, Edict, book 
13. It appears that these texts, like the Digest, followed the order of the Perpetual Edict 
which treated matters referred to arbitration immediately before the actio de recepto. 
Ulpian's book 13 dealt with the arbiter and enforcement of his decree, so discussion 
of the receptum in book 14 follows that. Gaius book 5 dealt heavily with the arbiter 
as did Paul book 13. 
56. It has been suggested that D.4.9.4 and 5 deal with the Furtum and damnum 
and not receptum. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 139. But Paul in fragment 4 refers to 
the risk borne by the nauta who can then bring the actio furti against the thief, and 
D. 47.5.1.4 makes clear that the nauta has this action if he has undertaken to restore 
the goods-i.e. he is liable for receptum. Fragment 5 citing Gaius discusses liability for 
safekeeping. Although it states that what is said of theft applies to property damage, 
the fragment centers on persons who agree to receive something on the understanding 
that it will be safe, a characteristic of the receptum. It seems likely that Gaius was discussing 
what liability existed under the receptum after the exception taken by Labeo for acts 
of God and piracy-it was for custodia just like persons who are paid for the safekeeping 
of goods. That meant the nauta was liable if the goods were stolen or damaged. In 
this sense, the passage is not referring to the actio furti for double damages, but simply 
to the liability under the receptum if the goods are stolen. See Feenstra, "Deux textes 
de Gaius sur Ia responsabilite contractuelle: D. 19.2.40 et D. 4.9.5," Droits de L'Antiquite 
et Socio/ogie Juridique: Melanges Henri uvy-Bruh/ pp. 105, 116 (Paris: Sirey, 1959) 
[Publications de l'Institut de Droit Romain de l'Universitt! de Paris, No. 27]. 
57. 0.4.9.3.1. 
58. "Lastly, it must be seen whether both a praetorian action on account of goods 
received and an action for theft can be brought in relation to the same matter. And 
Pomponius is doubtful. But the better opinion is that either by application to the judge 
or the defense of fraud, he ought to be restricted to one or other of them." D.4.9.3.5. 
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liability for accompanying baggage for which no separate fee was paid.s9 
An excerpt from Gaius followed as fragment five, noting that the fees 
paid ships' masters, innkeepers or stablekeepers are not for safekeeping, 
but the liability for custodia still exists. That liability is not only for 
theft but also damage to the goods. The context of Gaius is a discussion 
of the obligation of safekeeping, so the reference to theft in this passage 
is not a reference to the legal action for theft (actio furtr) but to the 
stealing itself. 60 
The junior member of the Edictal Committee excerpted the other 
passages in 4.9 from Paul, Edict, book 22 and Ulpian, Edict, book 
18. Those books dealt with the lex Aquilia. They discussed damages 
caused by slaves and quite naturally included a discussion of the action 
against nautae, caupones and stabularii for damaging property-the 
actio damni a.n.c.s. The junior committee member marked all the sections 
in these books of Paul and Ulpian that touched on the nautae and 
caupones and submitted them together to the senior member. 
If we assume that the Digest rubrics were tentatively agreed upon 
before the reading commenced, the senior member had no separate 
title under which to file material dealing with the actio damni a.n.c.s. 
Theophilus could place the excerpts of his junior -either in the title 
on actio de recepto which he was then working on or in the title on 
the actio furti a.n.c.s. whose contents he had not yet seen. The excerpts 
contained material on the furtum a.n.c.s. as well as the damnum a.n.c.s., 
but they did not come from a book on the furtum a.n.c.s. 
The excerpts from Paul dealt inter alia with two issues Theophilus 
had just excerpted from the actio de recepto-whether recovery for 
stolen or damaged property was available when no fee was paid for 
safekeeping and what was the relationship of the action against the 
thief to the actions against the na'!tae.61 This led the senior member 
59. "PAUL, Edict, book 13: Again, the action for theft is available to the "seaman" 
himself since he bears the risk, unless he should himself steal and afterward the property 
is stolen from him, or, in the case where another has stolen, the "seaman" himself is 
not solvent. I. If a seaman receives the property of a seaman, a stablekeeper that of 
a stablekeeper and an innkeeper that of an innkeeper, he will still be liable. 2. Vivian us 
said that this edict also related to things which are brought in after the merchandise 
has been placed on board and the contract of carriage made, although no freight for 
them is due, such as clothing and daily provisions, because these things are themselves 
accessories to the contract for the carriage of the other things." 0.4.9.4. 
60. "GAlUS, Provincial Edict, book 5: The seaman, innkeeper, and stablekeeper. 
receive a reward not on account of the safekeeping of the goods, but the seaman so 
that he may transport passengers, the innkeeper that he permit travelers to stay in the 
inn, the stablekeeper that he allow beasts to be stabled with him; and yet they are liable 
on account of safekeeping. For the fuller and tailor receive a fee not on account of 
safekeeping, but for the exercise of their skill; and yet they are liable under the action 
for lettmg on account of safekeeping. I. Whatever we have said about theft ought also 
to be understood about damage to property. For there ought to be no doubt that one 
who agrees to receive something on the understanding that it will be safe is held to 
undertake to keep it not only from being stolen but also from being damaged." 0.4.9.5. 
61. It included a discussion of the peculiar position of the slave hired out to a 
ship's master who stole or damaged his owner's property or who was injured by another, 
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to put the passage from Paul, Edict book 22 together with his own 
excerpts on the actio de recepto. He knew that the passages on liability 
for travelers were not inconsistent because they referred to different 
types of liability, having drawn them from different locations, but 
there was no transitional defining phrase to point this out. The passage 
from Ulpian's book 18 was added as 0.4.9.7 because it elaborated 
on issues discussed in 4.9.6. It is also possible that the provisions 
on waiver from D.4.9.7pr were understood to apply to the actio de 
recepto and that encouraged placement of the whole section in the 
actio de recepto. 
The explanation that each subcommittee placed only the excerpts 
they read in a single title is not complete, however. All the commissioners 
would have known that two separate edicts existed-and the Sabinian 
Committee read and excerpted several paragraphs on the nauta's ability 
to sue the thief because the nauta was liable under the actio de recepto.62 
Honore believed the Sabinian Committee under Tribonian was 
responsible for editing the excerpts in book 4 while the Edictal Committee 
under Theophilus was responsible for editing book 47. If that is correct, 
the repetition and the inconsistencies should have troubled them. 
Although there are some explanations for their failure to move the 
excerpts from Paul, book 22, and Ulpian, Edict, book 18 into Digest 
book 47, ultimately the decision must be viewed as a mistake. 
3. The Lapse in Judgment 
One explanation is that the editors thought the actio damni a.n.c.s. 
more closely related to the actio de recepto than to the actiofurti a.n.c.s. 
The promise of safekeeping implied in the actio de recepto included 
safety from all harm, whether loss or damage.6J Thus, the Restoration 
title, 0.4.9, appropriately analyzes damage as just one type of loss 
a discussion that might be relevant to either receptum or furtum. Only the innkeeper 
reference seems out of place. 
62. 0.47.2.14.17; 0.47.5.1.4. 
63. 0.4.9.3.1; 0.4.9.5.1. Another possible explanation for the placement would be 
that the actio furti a.n.c.s. was for double damages but the actio damni a.n.c.s. was 
for single damages like the actio de recepto. The person who damaged the goods would 
be liable to an action on the lex Aquilia, which was for single damages only unless 
the defendant denied liability. It would be extraordinary for the vicarious liability under 
the actio damni a.n.c.s. to exceed the liability of the perpetrator.' 
But 0.4.9.1.1 says this actio in factum lies for double. The previous passage discusses 
an action for damnum. Citing this portion of the Digest, both Lenel and Huvelin agree 
that the actio damni a.n.c.s. is for double damages. Lenel, supra note 9 at 205. Huvelin, 
supra note 27 at 129. Although it might be argued that the texf refers to the actio 
furti a.n.c.s. or to double damages for denying liability, it is a powerful support for 
Huvelin's description of the evolution of the actio damni a.n.c.s. if it was for double 
damages. They would make sense only as a wholesale transfer of the formula for the 
actio furti a.n.c.s. to the actio damni a.n.c.s. 
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whereas an action for theft of goods is distinct from an action for 
damages to goods. 
Further, the editors may have believed that the prefatory words 
of each of the excerpted fragments also applied to the actio de recepto 
even though they were originally stated with respect to the actio damni 
a.n.c.s. and the actio furti a.n.c.s. Fragment 6 begins with the issue 
of liability for the goods of the person who has obtained lodging 
or passage gratuitously. It follows logically from the discussion in 
fragment 5 on the absence of separate payment for the luggage of 
travelers and passengers, and demonstrates that liability is not affected 
by whether the services are free or must be paid for. Fragment 6 
continues with a hypothetical involving one person's slave who is 
employed by another on a ship or inn. The liability of the employer 
to the owner may have been the same for both the actio de recepto 
and the actio furti a.n.c.s.64 
Fragment 7 begins with references to the liability of ships' masters 
for the acts of their sailors, but then turns to the potential waiver by 
passengers of their rights against ships' masters. Waiver does not seem 
appropriate for the actio furti a.n.c.s. since it is based on the praetor's 
edict and the alleged fault of ships' masters in selection of the crew 
and not on the contract.65 If it were applied to the actio de recepto, 
however, it would make sense and buttress the argument that strict 
liability under the actio de recepto was contractual.66 Further, there 
is some joint application to the subsequent discussion of the liability 
of ships' masters for damage to the crew,67 
64. The employer is liable to the owner for loss of goods, even if the owner's slave 
stole them. 0.4.9.6.1. The employer may not be liable to the owner if the slave was 
injured by someone else who can be held liable independently. 0.4.9.6.2. This could 
apply to the actio de recepto if the slave as employee is not considered property accepted 
for safekeeping. 0.4.9.6.3 discusses the liability of the innkeeper for the actio furti a.n.c.s., 
but the limitation on the victim to either a suit against the perpetrator or against the 
operator in 0.4.9.6.4 applies to the actio de recepto as well. 0.4.9.3.1. 
65. 0.44.7.5.6. Note that the liability waiver only occurs if it is waived by a passenger 
who would be capable of watching the property. It does not apply to shipments of 
goods unaccompanied by owners or their representatives. Given the harshness of imposing 
double damages in a case of vicarious liability, it is not unreasonable to permit a waiver 
despite its exceptional nature. 
66. The sentence on waiver was probably an interpolation. It states that if there 
is a waiver, the ship's master is not sued, i.e. there is no action. Thus, the following 
sentence, which begins "This action," refers to an action previously discussed and the 
sentence on waiver of liability appears to interrupt the natural grammatical progression. 
Waiver is an example of a situation for which the ship's master bears no liability, so 
the comment does relate to the prior statement that the ship's master bears no liability 
for the behavior of sailors off the ship. That explains its insertion, but it could have 
been wrenched from a different context where it referred ·originally to the actio de recepto. 
67. The ship's master is unlikely to have guaranteed safekeeping to the crew member 
unless the individual is also shipping goods or working his passage. Thus, to whom 
a ship's master is liable may be alike for the actio de recepto and the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
0.4.9.7.2. 
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These explanations for the placement of fragments 6 and 7 in the 
Restoration title are plausible, but the close relationship between the 
actio damni a.n.c.s. and the actio furti a.n.c.s. should have prevailed 
as an organizing principle. The references to the actio damni a.n.c.s. 
in the fragments are intertwined with references to the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
and therefore should have been placed in the title dealing with that 
action. Unlike the actio de recepto, the actio damni a.n.c.s. and the 
actio furti a.n.c.s. apply only when the loss or injury is inflicted by 
the operator or his employees. Although both the actio de recepto and 
the actio damni a.n.c.s. lie for damage to goods, they are otherwise 
quite distinct. In short, the commissioners made a mistake. 
Despite the inappropriate placement of the fragments, the evidence 
is strong that there were at least two separate actions with different 
characteristics that coexisted in Justinian's era to respond to problems 
of theft, damage and loss in inns, stables and aboard ships-the vicarious 
liability of the actio furti a.n.c.s. with its double damages and the strict 
liability of the actio de recepto. 
IV. The Origin and Development of the 
Explanations for the Actions 
The inconsistencies in the scope of liability and the measure of 
damages are easily resolved by the conclusion that there were two 
separate actions against nautae, caupones et stabularii. The explanation 
for the inadequacy of the Digest's justifications for those actions is 
more controversial. The statement in the innkeeper's duty paragraph 
that innkeepers chose long term residents but cannot refuse persons 
making a journey is probably a post-classical interpolation impelled 
by the desire to attribute fault. The contradiction in the operator's choice 
paragraph which states that nautae, innkeepers, and stablekeepers can 
choose whether to receive anyone is a phrase that lost its original meaning 
when the underlying law changed. An examination of the history of 
the actio furti a.n.c.s. and the actio de recepto reveals the real reasons 
behind their separate development and how the mistaken reasons became 
part of the Digest. 
A. The Obligation to Take Travelers-The Evolution ofthe Explanation 
for the Double Penalty of the Actio Furti A.N.C.S. 
The actio furti a.n.c.s. grew out of the actio furti (or action of 
theft). In the first century B.C. Servius Sulpicius Rufus responded to 
a case in which several persons had poured their grain together in a 
ship. The ship's master returned the grain to one of them and later 
the ship foundered and the rest of the grain was lost. Servius said 
that if the grain had been separately enclosed so as to belong to 
identifiable individuals separately, interchange would not be permitted 
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and the owners of the grain could sue the ship's master for theft.68 
The inappropriate mixing and misdelivery of the grain would probably 
be done by the crew at the behest of the captain, acting within the 
scope of his authority. Actio Furti for this behavior may have been 
the first step in making the operator of the ship liable for any theft 
committed by the crew. 
The Digest justifies the actio furti a.n. c.s. by the fault of the master 
in "using the services of bad men ''69 or because he "himself has made 
use of their services at his risk'770 and liability is "in respect of fault 
for employing such persons.'771 But making a bad choice of employees 
does not create double liability on employers in other businesses for 
thefts by their employees. Thus, the fault or culpa notion seems an 
afterthought rather than the original reason for the action. 
Huvelin contended that the actiofurti a.n.c.s. was the natural result 
of merchants bringing the actio furti where the goods they loaded on 
ship were not delivered. If nothing had happened to the vessel, the 
explanation must be theft. Although the thiers identity might not be 
known, it was likely to be a member of the crew. Huvelin thought 
the praetor may have decided the operator of the business should be 
liable anyway.72 But the Digest provisions on the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
allow recovery only where the plaintiff proves that the theft was 
committed by a member of the crew.73 
In extending the actio furti to liability of the nautae and others, 
the praetor was probably influenced by the likelihood of collusion 





72. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 120. 
73. 0.47.5.1.pr,6. 
74. Sargenti suggests the extension of the furtum was connected to the principle 
behind noxal liability. Manlio Sargenti, "Osservazioni sulla responsabilita dell'exercitor 
navis in diretto romano," Studi in memoria di Emilio Albertario, I (Milano: Giuffre, 
1953) pp. 553, 579-80. 
A property owner could not recover damages for theft from a slave because all 
goods obtained by a slave belong to the slave's master. "Slaves are in the power of 
their owners." Gaius, supra note 5 at 45 [1:52]. A slave also might be permitted by 
the master to have a "peculium" for his own use which would be subject to suit. However, 
the owner could sue the slave's master. Under the ancient principle of "noxal liability," 
the master had the choice of paying the amount owed by the slave or of turning the 
slave over to the injured party. "Noxal actions lie when sons in power and slaves commit 
a delict, for instance, theft or contempt. These actions allow the father or owner either 
to pay the damages as assessed in money, or to make noxal surrender .... Some noxal 
actions were established by statute, some by the Edict of the Praetor. Statutory instances 
are the action of theft under the Twelve Tables lind for wrongful loss under the Aquilian 
Act." /d. at 463-64 [11:75-76]. See also l..eage, supra note 8 at 69. This rule of "noxal 
liability" also applied to harm done by animals. 
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explanation offered for the actio de recepto.1s Collusion with employees 
was a greater problem in inns and stables, but it may have applied 
to ships as well.76 The possibility of collusion also existed for the long 
term lodger, whereas the casual relationship formed for the purpose 
of a single night's rest or passage on the boat would not be as likely 
to offer opportunities for conspiring against the other customers. 
Although fear of collusion underlay both the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
and the strict liability of the actio de recepto, that concern alone could 
not explain the existence of two actions or the penalty in the actio 
furti a.n.c.s .. The true explanation lay in the different paths by which 
the actions developed: the actio furti a.n.c.s. evolved out of the penal 
actio furti while the actio de recepto came from an express promise. 
But historical explanations for doctrine were not appealing to Roman 
jurists, who were concerned only with current doctrine.77 
The classical jurists usually expounded on rules without giving the 
reasons behind them, but post-classical writers influenced by the Greeks 
In republican Rome, this principle of noxal liability applied to the members of 
the family as well because all wealth was controlled by the paterfamilias. The paterfamilias 
could either pay compensation for wrongs done by family members, or surrender the 
offending member to the control of the injured person. In practice, of course, noxal 
surrender of family members would be unusual, and the paterfamilias would most likely 
pay the family debt. The noxal surrender of women swiftly disappeared on moral grounds. 
Noxal surrender of sons vanished more slowly, probably in line with the growth of 
sons' rights to some independent means "peculium." The extent of the "peculium" was 
greatly enlarged for soldiers during the many periods of warfare of the principate and 
the empire. Thus noxal liability for sons had essentially disappeared by the time of Justinian. 
Leage, supra at 423-26. This basis for liability did not apply to free employees who 
were personally responsible for their own wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it laid the foundation 
for finding persons liable for the wrongs done by members of their household. 
The employee of an innkeeper, stablekeeper or ship's master may have stayed on 
the premises where people and animals remained over the evenings. In this sense they 
were closer to members of the operator's household than in other businesses. Further, 
the long term lodger became identified with the household of the innkeeper because 
the innkeeper could exclude him. The overnight sojourner had no such identification 
because he was only a very temporary resident. With respect to these peculiar households, 
the traveler was at a special risk because he or she did not know the character of the 
operator or his employees. 
The growth of the peculium led to the end of noxal liability for family members. 
Only noxal liability for slaves remained. By Justinian's . era, an explanation which 
distinguished liability between lodgers and travelers in terms of membership in the 
household no longer seemed relevant because the paterfamilias was not liable for household 
members. 
75. 0.4.9.1.1 and 0.4.9.3.1. The explanation is usually considered an interpolation. 
76. Innkeepers generally had a bad reputation. See Kleberg, supra note 19 at 6, 
27-28, 74-97; Firebaugh, supra note 19 at 124, 135, 245. See also G. Hermansen, "Roman 
Inns and the Law: The Inns of Ostia," in Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of 
Edward Togo Salmon (J.A.S. Evans, ed.; Toronto: Hakkert, 1974) pp. 167-70. 
77. Gaius is exceptional in discussing the evolution of Roman law. See Fritz Schulz, 
Principles of Roman Law (trans. Marguerite Wolff; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) 
pp. 99, 102~5. 
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began to offer reasons for legal rules, interpolating them in the classical 
texts.78 They wanted an explanation to justify the law now, and an 
accident of history would not do. To justify infliction of a penalty, 
ordinarily the defendant must be at fault. Here there was no fault, 
unless it was the master's bad judgment in choosing the employee. That 
then became the justification offered. But fault in choice-culpa in 
e/igendo-:-does not work as well for the distinction between lodger and 
traveler unless it can be said that the lodger is "chosen" in a manner 
different from the traveler. And indeed that is exactly what the Digest 
says in the innkeeper's duty paragraph. Thus, a distinction founded 
in a prophylactic policy to prevent collusion in theft led to a post hoc 
rationalization of fault which required a difference between lodgers and 
travelers in terms of the innkeeper's ability to choose whether to accept 
them. 
B. The Power to Choose Customers-The Evolution of the Justification 
for the Actio de Recepto 
The reference to the power to choose customers in the operator's 
choice paragraph originated in a different context where the language 
served as effective justification for strict liability. The Latin phrase 
initially referred to the operator's decision to expressly promise to keep 
the goods of passengers or guests safe. Enforcing such an obligation 
was not too harsh, for the promisors voluntarily undertook it. Gradually, 
such a promise came to be implied in the contract for carriage or lodging, 
and it could not be avoided unless the innkeeper or ship's master expressly 
disclaimed it. The shift in the burden of expression was not perceived 
to alter the suit and did not affect the justification. When Justinian's 
compilers came to abridge the writings on the actio de recepto, they 
found the reference to choice with respect to making a promise; but 
now that the promise was implicit, the same words meant choice with 
respect to accepting the customer. Since ships' masters had such a choice, 
the compilers left the explanatory passage intact although its meaning 
had changed. 
1. Original express promise in shipping contract to be responsible for 
loss or damage 
The origin of the actio de recepto was an express guarantee by 
the person managing the boat to keep the goods safe. 79 The origin 
78. /d. at 98-100. 
79. There is general agreement that the actio furti a.n.c.s. preceded the receptum. 
Sargenti, supra note 74 at 553-80; J.C. Van Oven, "Actio Recepto et Actio Locati," 
24 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 137. Cf. Francisco De Robertis, Receptum 
Nautarum (1952). If strict liability existed pursuant to the actio de recepto, there would 
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is reflected in the edict which provides for an action against the nauta, 
caupones et stabularii "in respect of what they have received and 
undertaken to keep safe. ''80 The language suggests an expresss 
undertaking to keep the goods safe. 
Further, in discussing the option of the owner of stolen property 
to sue either the thief in a civil action or the operator of the ship, 
stable or inn in a praetorian action, Ulpian adds, "But if the innkeeper 
or the ship's master has guaranteed the safety of the goods, it is he 
and not the owner of the stolen thing who will have the civil action 
of theft because, by his guarantee, he incurs the risk of safekeeping,''8I 
The passage suggests that the assurance of safekeeping must be express, 
because it departs from the norm stated in the prior sentence in which 
the owner of the goods would have the action for theft.s2 The express 
nature of the promise to keep goods safe is also supported by the evidence 
from papyrus records of shipping transactions in Egypt. They reveal 
during the Roman era of Egypt that shippers made an express promise 
to keep the goods safe. sJ 
have been no need for the actio furti a.n.c.s., which provides liability in more limited 
circumstances. Absolute liability should be a sufficient deterrent to negligence or 
misconduct by the nautae or caupones without any additional spur of double damages. 
If the actio furti a.n.c.s. came first, however, there would have been a need to create 
a more extensive civil action (receptum) to cover situations where the actio furti a.n.c.s. 
failed to apply. On the other hand, it might be argued that the express guarantee of 
the safety of goods came first; then an action (actio furti a.n.c.s.) that was available 
in the absence of the express statement; and finally a liability which collapsed the express 
guarantee and the general norm in receptum. 
80. 0.4.9.lpr. The person who lost goods in an inn or aboard a ship could also 
sue under the civil law for negligence in the leasing or hiring or for fraud by a bailee 
in deposit. 
81. 0.47.5.1.4. 
82. If the holder paid the owner for the loss, the owner had to cede his actions 
against the wrongdoer to the holder. For example, "If a fuller or a clothes-mender loses 
clothing and then gives satisfaction to the [clothing's] owner on this score, the owner 
must cede the vindicatio and the condictio for it." 0.19.2.25.8. If the property was stolen 
from a holder who was liable to the owner for custodia, which includes liability in the 
case of third party theft, the holder could maintain the action in furtum. The owner 
then was barred unless the holder was insolvent. Thus, the holder could obtain multiple 
damages while the owner could get from him only the value of the thing stolen. There 
was, however, only a remote possibility that the holder would actually profit from this 
rule, because of the uncertainty of catching the thief and the probability that, if caught, 
the thief would not even be able to pay the value of the stolen goods. Leage, supra 
note 8 at 398-407. At the same time, ships' masters might worry that a thieving crew 
member would leave town if the legal process was long delayed. Thus, ships' masters 
might have been influenced to make promises of strict liability in order to be able to 
bring the actio furti against their crew members immediately, rather than waiting until 
they lost a suit under the actio furti a.n.c.s. before being able to obtain a right to sue 
the thief. 
83. "The meaning of the clause is that nauta takes the responsibility for every casus 
including vis maior." Raphael Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the 
light of the Papyri: 332 B.C.-640 A.D. (New York: Herald Square Press, 1944, p. 288). 
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The shipping arrangements might not be made in person, and that 
might make it difficult to enter into an enforceable stipulatio.84 Under 
the agreement of hire, locati-conducti, ships' masters were liable for 
loss caused by their fault.ss If the whole ship was hired, the merchant 
could bring an action for his lost goods on the hire, ex conducto. If 
the nauta was hired to transport the goods, the merchant could sue 
on the act of letting, ex locato.B6 When it was unclear whether the 
owner of goods "hired the ship or leased out the transporting of the 
cargo" as a job, the praetor would give an actio infactum.81 But these 
actions were based on fault. Liability without fault required a promise 
of safekeeping. If that promise was in additK>n to the agreement of 
carriage, it might not have fit the previously existing categories of 
enforceable promises. That would be sufficient to lead the praetor to 
announce in an edict that such promises were enforceable. 
2. Original explanation refers to discretion to promise 
The operator's choice paragraph states that strict liability on the 
nauta and others was not too harsh because "nam est in ipsorum arbitrio, 
ne quem recipiant" (emphasis supplied), which has been translated as 
"it is in their own discretion whether to receive anyone." But "recipere" 
is ambiguous. It may refer to making a promise or taking responsibility 
rather than simply receiving the person or the goods.88 If given the 
meaning of "promise," the statement is an excellent rebuttal to criticism 
that strict liability is too harsh. If ships' masters were not willing to 
undertake liability for loss that they did not cause, they did not have 
to. "It is in their own discretion whether to promise anyone." That 
is probably the original meaning of the phrase. 
3. Express promise becomes naturale negotii an implied term of the 
agreement by the agreement by the time of Justinian if not before 
There is some controversy over whether innkeepers or nautae were 
liable only if they expressly promised to keep the goods safe or whether 
the promise was implicit.B9 Most commentators agree that the 
84. Stipulatio was a formal method of creating a unilateral obligation by means 
of an oral question, setting out the terms of the obligation, and an immediate oral 
answer acceding to those terms. 
85. 0.19.2.13.1,2; D.4.9.3.1. 
86. D.4.9.3.1. 
87. D.l9.5.1. 
88. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 137; J.B.C. Stephen, "The Water-Carrier and His 
Responsibility," The Law Quarterly Review 46:116, 119 (1896); Van Oven, "Actio de 
Recepto," supra note 79 at 137, 149. 
89. Crook, supra note 27 at 226. 
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edict as stated in the Digest imposed an agreement to keep goods 
safe in the absence of any disclaimer.9o 
First, the ship's master is said to accept goods and undertake that 
they will be safe "even if they have not been handed over .... [H]e 
receives for safekeeping all the goods which have been brought onto 
the ship. ''91 Although this passage could be read as a guide to interpreting 
the extent of an express. undertaking, the statement seems more likely 
to assume that allowing goods on board involves such an undertaking 
without an express statement. 
Second, the Digest says liability for loss extends to goods which 
were not even mentioned in the contract: 
this edict also related to things which are brought in after the merchandise 
has been placed on board and the contract of carriage made, although no 
freight for them is due, such as clothing and daily provisions, because these 
things are themselves accessories to the contract for the carriage of the other 
things.92 
An express undertaking to keep them safe would be unlikely. 
Third, liability does not depend on an exchange of value for an 
undertaking to keep goods safe. 
The seaman, innkeeper, and stablekeeper receive a reward not on account 
of the safekeeping of the goods, but the seaman so that he may transport 
passengers, the innkeeper that he permit travelers to stay in the inn, the 
stablekeeper that he allow beasts to be stabled with him; and yet they are 
liable on account of safekeeping. 93 
This suggests that the liability extends to all goods with no specific 
transaction or promise to keep them safely. 
90. Leage says the undertaking was implied upon the promisee's entry, but the 
relationship between the liability on the undertaking and the liability for tort was 
uncertain. Leage, supra note 8 at 381,422. Mackeldey says the ship's master or innkeeper 
who receives the things of a traveler in his ship or inn contracts a strict obligation, 
and may be sued in an action in factum de recepto. Mackeldey, supra note 27 at 361. 
"Receptum nautae, cauponis, stabularii was an undertaking required by the edict of 
ships' masters, innkeepers and livery stable-owners that their clients' goods would be 
safe (res salvas fore) while on their vessel or premises." The Institutes of Justinian 
(trans. J.A.C. Thomas; Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1975) p. 249, 280-82. See also Max Radin, Handbook of Roman Law (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1927) p. 254-55. Leon-Robert Mt!nager, "'Naulum' et Receptum Rem 
Salvum Fore' Contribution a L'Etude de Ia Responsabilitt! Contractuelle dans les 
"I;ransports Maritimes, en Droit Romain," Revue Historique Du Droit Fran_fais et 
Etranger 37:177-213; 385-411 (1960). 
91. 0.4.9.1.8. 
92. 0.4.9.4.2. This statement of Vivianus quoted by Paul is also found in a slightly 
different form in a fragment of Ulpian. 0.4.9.1.6. J.A. Crook said that the actio de recepto 
and the actio furti a.n.c.s. applied only to baggage and not to the carriage of freight in 
general. Crook, supra note 27 at 226. But the quotes from Vivianus indicate that the actio 
de recepto applied to merchandise as well as baggage. Further, other passages on the actio 
de recepto specify liability for all (omnium) goods (0.4.9.1.8), and discuss merchandise that 
had been pledged as security (0.4.9.1.7) and is therefore unlikely to be simply baggage. 
93. D.4.9.5pr. 
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Fourth, the passage continues: "For the fuller and tailor receive 
a fee not on account of safekeeping, but for the exercise of their skill; 
and yet they are liable under the action for letting on account of 
safekeeping." A fuller is a person who cleans and thickens cloth. The 
liability of a fuller under the contract includes liability for theft by 
third parties.94 The analogy to the fuller and the tailor are to occupations 
where liability is not based on an express undertaking, but on an implied 
understanding arising out of the job.95 Thus, the analogy suggests that 
the ship's master, innkeeper or stablekeeper were likewise liable without 
an express promtse. 
Fifth, the rationale offered for liability is not that it accords with 
the promise of the ship's master or the innkeeper, but that it is an 
important protection against collusion with thieves. This policy makes 
more sense applied to all transactions rather than just those where a 
special promise has been made. 
Sixth, the provision that the person in charge of the ship will not 
be sued if the passengers accept his declaration that he is not liable 
indicates that liability was implicit unless expressly repudiated.96 The 
disclaimer might be an effective warning to customers that it was risky 
to deal with that operator. 
Finally, evidence that the actio de recepto had become an implicit 
term of the contract of transport rather than needing an express 
agreement is found in the papyri. The express clauses of the third and 
94. "A fuller lost your clothing; there is a third party from whom you may 
claim them, but you do not choose to reclaim them. Despite this you sue 
the fuller on the lease. But [Labeo thinks that] the judge would determine 
whether you can better proceed against the thief and obtain your property 
from him, at the fuller's expense, of course; but if he observes that this is 
impossible for you, then he will make the fuller pay you but will force you 
to provide him with your actions." 0.19.2.60.2. 
J.A.C. Thomas, "Furtum and Locatio Conductio," II Irish Jurist (New Series) 170 
(1976) attacked this passage as a corruption. He argued that liability of the fuller is 
independent of the discovery of the wrongdoer and that no official would deprive an 
individual of an action under these circumstances. 
The fuller's liability is a civil action on the agreement-locatio operis. Although 
there was a similar action against the nauta, it did not include liability for theft by 
underlings. Thus, Pomponius expressed surprise at the existence of the praetorian action 
against the innkeeper or ship's master, but noted that liability in hire was for fault while 
the action against the innkeeper or ship's master lay without regard to fault. 0.4.9.3.1. 
95. "If Ude's theory could be accepted, according to which 'recipere' only means 
to take over responsibility and the 'salvum fore recipere' of the edict indicates nothing 
but a praetorian pact, difficulties would vanish. But 'recipere' here signifies to receive 
the person rather than the higher liability in respect of him or his property." Stephen, 
supra note 88 at 136. 
96. D.4.9.7pr. It may be argued, however, that this waiver applies only to waiver 
of the liability under the actio furti where double damages lie for the behavior of the 
crew of a ship or the staff of an inn. 
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fourth centuries are no longer found in the shipping documents of the 
ftfth and sixth centuries.97 
The movement from express to implicit undertaking was eased 
by a reduction in t~e liability of the ships' masters. Labeo is said to 
have made an exception in the actio de recepto for shipwreck and piracy. 
But that left the ships~ masters liable for something very close to custodia, 
which was the liability of bailees for hire. While it would be harsh 
to impose liability on ships' masters for force majeure without an express 
agreement, it was not unreasonable to imply an agreement to incur 
the common lesser obligation. 
4. Explanation now refers to ability to reject passengers and freight 
To recapitulate: early texts said that the strict liability of the actio 
de recepto was not too harsh because it did not lie unless the ship's 
master decided to promise expressly to keep goods safely (ne quem 
recipiant). Over time, this guarantee of safekeeping became an implicit 
element of the shipping contract. It attached whenever the goods were 
received on board. The new legal context affected the interpretation 
of the inherently ambiguous "recipere." It changed its meaning from 
"taking responsibility for" in classical times to "receiving" in Justinian's 
era.9s Thus, the translation of ne quem recipiant in the operator's choice 
paragraph as "whether to receive anyone" is correct. Ships' masters 
did have the power to refuse to carry goods or persons, so it was a 
true statement of law,99 but it no longer made much sense as an 
explanation. 
The evolution from express promise to implicit term left its traces 
in Digest passages which distinguished between ships' masters that had 
undertaken to keep the goods safely and those who had not. After 
the undertaking became implicit, the ships' masters could expressly 
repudiate it. It was still important to discuss the effect of choosing 
97. Taubenschlag, supra note 83 at 287-89. 
98. "In classic law, the receptum was the declaration of the clear and explict will 
of the captain of the boat, that he had received the goods and that he was agreeing 
to deliver them sa/vas, however in the law of Justinian recipere signified simply accepting 
the goods in the boat (illatio in navem), or even at dockside (in litore), without an 
express clause of guaranty. That was a consequence of a new juridical regime, i.e. of 
the changed notion of receptum which becomes a naturale negotii. This change manifested 
itself even in the rubrica of the title D.4.9, for instead of the edict's expression on the 
receptum, i.e. "quod cuisque salvumfore receperint," one reads there "nautae, caupones, 
stabularii ut recepta restituant." Thus the words salvum fore have disappeared." J.C. 
Van Oven, Book Review of De Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 2 Revue lnternationale 
des Droits de /'Antiquit~ (3d Series) 423, 427 (1956) [translated from the French]. 
99. The Digest offers other passages that support the ship's master's ability to choose 
whether to take passengers. For example, the owner is not liable if the captain violates 
instructions and takes on passengers when hired only to take goods. D.l4.1.1.12. There 
are no similar passages about innkeepers. 
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whether to be bound by an undertaking to restore goods. The early 
texts treated the absence of a promise as the standard. Although they 
would have been phrased differently if written after the development 
of an implicit obligation, the early texts continued to be accurate 
statements. Thus, they were not altered by the compilers. 
5. The hypothesis of a separate edict governing the actions against the 
Innkeeper and Stablekeeper 
The praetor may have issued separate edicts for nautae and for 
caupones which were consolidated.IOO The theory that there were 
originally separate edicts is supported by the language of the Digest. 
Sentences that begin with references to those who operate ships, inns 
or livery stables conclude with reference only to the ship. 101 This suggests 
that the initial references to inns and livery stables were added to a 
statement on the liability of ships' masters.1o2 
These arguments suggest that the language of choice in D.4.9.lpr, 
the operator's choice paragraph, originally applied only to ships' 
masters.IOJ But Justinian's scholars surely knew that adding "innkeepers 
and stablekeepers" to create a single edict in the first sentence of the 
chapter made the language of choice refer also to innkeepers. Indeed, 
scholars who propose the separate edict theory have argued that the 
100. J.A.C. Thomas, "Carriage by Sea," 6 Revue lnternationale de Droit de 
I'Antiquite (3d Series) 489 (1960). Van Oven argued that ships' masters were largely 
under a different juridical regime than innkeepers. The ship's master contracted for his 
carrier to be an active agent with respect to passengers and goods. He carried them 
from one place to another; so masters were conduct ores operis faciendi. The inn and 
the stable merely leased space to the customer and were locatio re, not locatio operis. 
Van Oven, Review, supra note 98 at 425. But Van Oven has overstated the case. Thomas 
noted that sometimes the sea carriage was also merely a lease of space and also /ocatores 
rerum. Thomas, "Carriage by Sea," supra at 496. Further, there is some question whether 
lodging and stabling were considered purely as leased space, especially since connected 
services such as feeding the horse were likely to be involved. 
101. D.47.5.1.pr; D.47.5.1.2. 
102. Wherever a principle of general application is stated in D. 47.5, the specific 
example always refers to shipping. The innkeeper is specifically discussed only at D. 
47.5.6 where the liability rules differentiate between lodgers and overnight guests, a 
consideration inapplicable to ships' masters. Indeed, the reason given for imposing liability 
on the innkeeper for lodgers, i.e. that the innkeeper selects his permanent residents, applies 
to the ship's master who may choose his passengers; nevertheless, the ship's master is 
not liable under this chapter for the behavior of passengers. The impression created 
is that one author wrote on the edict for ships' masters, and someone else later added 
comments on innkeeper liability from another edict because the edicts shared a common 
trait of imposing vicarious liability. 
103. If "innkeepers and stablekeepers" were inserted next to "ships' masters" in 
commentary that originally dealt with ships' masters, a phrase relating solely to ships' 
masters could erroneously be made to apply to both. Thus, one explanation for the 
apparent conflict in the passages on the duty to serve is that the ability to choose whom 
to serve described in D.4.9.1.1 referred only to the ships' master. 
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operator's choice paragraph consists of sections taken from commentary 
on the edict on nautae combined with a section taken from commentary 
on caupones et stabularii.t04 Thus, even if the theory of separate origins 
is true, the compilers intended that commentary applicable to one 
business be understood to refer to the others as well. 105 Tribonian and 
his coworkers could see that the text stated that innkeepers had a choice 
whether to serve customers-and it is hard to understand why they 
would let it stand if they knew it to be false. 
V. The Obligation to Accept Customers 
Thus far, this article has explained the apparent conflict in the 
liability of ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers for losses of 
their customers' property and the reasons for the weakness of the 
explanations offered. But that does not resolve the question whether 
there was an obligation in Justinian's era for innkeepers to serve the 
public. 
A. Theories to Reconcile Digest Language With a Duty to Serve 
A number of theories have been offered to show that the language 
in the Digest on the obligation to serve the public is not contradictory. 
Several theories insist that there was a duty to serve the public. 
1. "Recipere" Means Promise 
The prior discussion demonstrated that the text of the operator's 
choice paragraph could be read to say only that the operators of the 
specified businesses had discretion whether to promise to keep the goods 
safe. That reading eliminates any direct statement that innkeepers could 
decide whether to accept persons, and therefore it would be consistent 
with the proposition that the innkeepers had a duty to accept travelers. 
This theory has several flaws. First, the promise to keep goods 
safe was implied and had to be specifically repudiated. Although the 
operator of the business could avoid being held for a promise, it is 
awkward to describe this as a choice of whether to make a promise 
104. Van Oven, Review, supra note 98 at 425. 
105. Under the theory of separate edicts, the historical development was: Originally, 
someone stated that enforcement of strict liability against nautae was not harsh because 
they can choose whether to undertake such responsibility. By the time of Ulpian, the 
undertaking was implicit in the agreement of carriage. Ulpian repeated the justification 
he had heard, but now it meant that nautae can choose whether to accept particular 
passengers-an accurate statement, but a weak explanation for the imposition of strict 
liability. The compilers then took this explanation and applied it to innkeepers in the 
process of uniting the receptum edicts. 
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when the decision to make no promise requires an express statement 
of repudiation. 
Second, recipere in the phrase ne quem recipiant is more likely 
to refer to receiving than to promising, for it is part of a sentence 
in which recipere is used to mean "receive" rather than "undertake 
responsibility." The remainder of the sentence refers to conspiracy of 
the operators with thieves against those whom they receive: "nisi hoc 
esset statutum, materia daretur cum furibus aduersus eos quos recipiunt 
coeundi"-"unless this provision were laid down, there would be given 
the means for conspiring with thieves against those whom they receive. "106 
The possibility of collusion with thieves exists whether the ship's master 
or innkeeper expressly undertook to keep goods safe or not. Thus the 
passage makes more sense if "recipere" refers to receiving persons and 
their goods rather than undertaking responsibility for them.I07 But if 
"recipere" means "receive" throughout the sentence, then the passage 
states that the innkeeper or ship's master does not have to receive guests 
or passengers. 
2. Mistake in the Latin Text 
A second alternative is to interpret the right to refuse to receive 
anyone as a reference to the decision whether to get into the business 
at all. "The glossators, followed by Cujas, Pothier, and Gluck, read 
'neminem recipere' instead of 'ne quem recipiant.' In other words, sea-
carriers must carry for all who applied to them, but no one need be 
a sea-carrier. "108 The suggestion neatly reconciles the conflicting passages 
on the obligation to serve the public by denying that the first passage 
deals with that obligation. It also is more consistent with the '·'innkeeper's 
duty" paragraph, 0.47.5.1.6, that categorizes passengers with travelers 
as persons for whom the operator is not liable in the action for theft. 
Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence that the Latin text was 
altered. 109 The existence of a choice on whether to enter a business 
is a weak basis for arguing that strict liability is not harsh. The better 
explanation is that the phrase in question initially referred to the 
discretion to make a promise; but if that explanation is correct, the 
106. 0.4.9.1.1. I Watson, supra note 2 at 160. 
107. If the ship's master undertook responsibility expressly for the goods of another, 
it would be extraordinary to let him off. Fear of collusion with thieves would be unnecessary 
to justify the receptum. 
108. Stephen, supra note 88 at 136. 
109. As discussed in part III, 0.47.5.1 is not really inconsistent on liability for 
passenger's behavior, but simply refers to a different action. The only conflict in texts 
deals with the innkeeper's obligation. There is no indication in the Digest that a ship's 
master had an obligation to carry passengers. Thus, there is no greater reason to believe 
the text here was inaccurate than that the text in 4 7.5 on innkeepers was inaccurate 
or than that a mistake was made. 
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Latin phrase would be ne quem and not the altered neminem. 
Furthermore, if the carrier was required to serve all applicants, it would 
be difficult for it to impose a waiver of liability. Yet the ·oigest makes 
it clear that the carrier had that power.IIO 
3. Innkeeper Choice Refers Only to Lodgers 
A third reading reconciles the conflict by positing that the operator's 
choice paragraph referred only to receiving lodgers. I I I The distinction 
between lodgers and travelers is found in discussions of the actio furti 
or damni a.n.c.s. at 0.47.5 and 4.9.6.3 where it is used as a rationale 
for distinguishing for whose acts the innkeeper is liable.II2 But the 
operator's choice paragraph deals with the actio de recepto and the 
issue is not for whose acts but to which persons is the innkeeper liable. 
There is nothing in the text of 0.4.9.1 to suggest that the discussion 
is limited to lodgers and that the innkeeper would not be liable for 
the losses of overnight guests. The rationale of fear of conspiracy to 
rob applies equally well or better to the fears of travelers rather than 
lodgers. In short, this theory had no good linguistic basis and is justified 
only by assuming that the distinction drawn in 47.5 is correct and that 
preserving it consistently must override all other considerations. The 
specific references to lodgers are appropriate for the actio furti or damni 
a.n.c.s., but the references in book 4 concerning the actio de recepto 
cover all customers. 
B. Reconciling Digest Language With the Right to Reject Travelers 
Several alternative readings lead to an interpretation of the 
innkeeper's duty paragraph, 0.47.5.1.6, as a reference to the desirability 
110. 0.4.9.7pr. Perhaps a carrier could secure a liability waiver by lower prices, 
but the hypothesis of a different charge where there was a guarantee of safekeeping 
runs contrary to the tenor of passages stating that liability for goods attached even if 
the owner paid no fee for their carriage. 0.4.9.4.2; 0.4.9.5pr; 0.4.9.6. But see Leon-
Robert Mc!nager, supra note 90 (citing 0.20.4.6.1 for the proposition that merchants 
paid a higher price for the receptum, although that paragraph appears to refer to payments 
for exertions to save cargo threatened with loss rather than payments for a guarantee 
of safety). 
Ill. "Guyet supposed the first passage referred to the persons 'qui habitandi causa 
recipiuntur,' and the second to those 'qui hospitio recipiuntur.'" Stephen, supra note 
88. 
112. "The innkeeper is liable under the actio in factum on account of those who 
are living in the inn. However, this does not relate to one who is received as a passing 
guest, such as a traveler." But liability under the actio de recepto is specifically extended 
to the acts of travelers-"uiatorum" by Gaius at 0.4.9.2. This contradiction in liability 
is normally explained by finding Paul's statement to be a reference to the actio furti 
a.n.c.s. and not to the actio de recepto. 
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of taking in travelers and not to a legal obligation.IIJ First, the innkeeper 
might not know anything about the stranger who appeared suddenly 
at his door, and thus lacked information as a basis for choice. In this 
sense, he would not be able to choose the traveler as he chose lodgers. 
Second, the innkeeper could not refuse to give the traveler a room, 
because it would undermine his business if individuals could not rely 
upon getting accommodations there. Third, he is unable to refuse because 
the "road agent" needs shelter and the innkeeper is under a moral 
imperative to afford it. These readings show that the phrase does not 
require the conclusion that the innkeeper is legally obligated to accept 
travelers. Thus they support the proposition from the operator's choice 
paragraph, 0.4.9.1, that there was no obligation under Roman law 
for innkeepers to serve the public.II4 
These attempts to interpret the phrase resolve the inconsistency 
in statements on the duty to serve the public, but they create their 
own problems. Innkeepers do know the identity of at least some recurring 
travelers and thus would be able to make an informed choice on accepting 
them. If occasional individuals were rejected, it might have only a 
marginal effect on business. Without an advance reservation, no one 
can rely on an inn being available rather than full. Thus, if an innkeeper 
has a legal right to refuse a traveler, it seems unrealistic to say that 
he cannot. Certainly "nee repel/ere potest iter agentes" -"he cannot refuse 
the traveler" appears to go beyond a moral obligation. Although it 
does not say he "may not" refuse the traveler, which would be most 
appropriate for a legal limitation, even lawyers sometimes use "can" 
in stating what the law allows and forbids. 
C. The Absence of Law 
Each of the foregoing explanations assumes that there was a rule 
of law with respect to the innkeeper's obligation to accept travelers. 
Yet the statement of the "rule" comes in the guise of premise for reasoning. 
There are no other passages in the Digest on the obligation of carriers 
to accept goods, though breach of such an obligation might be expected 
to be a delict. In fact, the issue would be very unlikely to arise. The 
113. "But the opinion usually accepted is, that Roman innkeepers and sea-carriers 
were under no obligation to receive or carry for all who applied to them, and that 
the 'nee repellere potest iter agentes' merely signified that such a course would be detrimental 
from a business point of view." Stephen, supra note 88 at 136. 
114. "At common law, the innkeeper was held to be exercising a public calling 
and under a duty to receive all guests against whom no reasonable objection could be 
. made. That was not the case at Roman law. Innkeepers could freely select their guests 
as carriers could select the persons they wished to contract with. Indeed this choice 
is given as the reason for imposing a specially grave burden upon them." Radin, supra 
note 90 at 255. 
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innkeeper has every incentive to accept the traveler if he has room. 
A rejection would be upsetting, but it would not produce easily measured 
monetary damages that would provide incentive for suit. The slim 
likelihood of damages would not outweigh the disruption of travel plans 
which would result if the excluded person sought redress in court. 115 
The lack of any authoritative determination of the innkeepers' 
responsibility to serve the public explains why the conflicting statements 
in different books of the Digest were not reconciled. Justinian's scholars 
working in different areas did not find any conflict with current law 
because there was no current law. The statements of law on the actio 
de recepto and the actio furti a.n.c.s. were accurate, and the assumption 
used in reasoning was an incidental remark of little importance. 
If there was no edict, it is unlikely that anyone could sue for damages 
because they had been rejectea from an inn.II6 However, there may 
have been enough uncertainty in the edict which gave rise to the action 
for deliberate affronts (iniuria) to leave room for argument that the 
action was available for rejection from an inn. 117 After all, if there 
was room at the inn, exclusion would signify a personal revulsion that 
could be seen as detrimental to an individual's reputation. Further, 
the action lay where "one is not allowed to use the public baths or 
to sit in a theater seat or to conduct business, to sit or converse in 
some other such place, or to use his own property."118 This form of 
iniuria dealt with third party interferences with conduct at a place where 
one has a right to be, but it suggests the broader principle that there 
were places from which people might not be barred without affront. 
It might be argued that this should apply to inns, although inns were 
not specifically discussed and the issue of its application had never 
arisen. 1 
If the compilers had been forced to confront the issue, they probably 
would have found that innkeepers had no obligation to accept travelers. 
Exclusion from an inn is just not sufficiently close to accepted incidents 
of iniuria-the insult may not be public, the affront is based on inferences 
from behavior rather than specific slander, and legal recognition of 
exclusion as an insult would compel establishment of an involuntary 
115. See Bruce Frier, Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980) pp. 48-52 (noting reasons for not bringing suit, including smallness 
of sums involved where dispute is over short term rental). 
116. It is possible, however, that municipal laws or innkeeper association by-laws 
may have regulated inns and required the!!\ to serve all comers. 
117. See Crook, supra note 27 at 250-55 (discussing the development of iniuria 
from physical assault in the Twelve Tables through forcible entry on private premises 
under the lex Cornelia and libel and slander by a senatusconsultum to the broad and 
open language of the praetor's edict). The lex Cornelia did not allow suit because someone 
invaded another's temporary lodgings, but this principle dealt only with the trespass 
aspects of iniuria. 0.47.10.5.5. 
118. D.47.10.13.7. 
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relationship. Since the statement that innkeepers must accept travelers 
was in the form of an explanation for a rule which was accurate, the 
compilers did not focus on whether the explanation was the right rule-
in other words, they did not have any reason to pull together all passages 
relating to the obligation to serve and try to make them consistent. 
The only concern they had was whether the statement on the duty 
to serve was incorrect. In the absence of any definitive ruling, there 
was a sufficient argument for such a duty to prevent its unequivocal 
rejection. 
VI. Conclusion 
The simple attempt to determine whether innkeepers in ancient 
Rome had a legal obligation to accept travelers began with an apparent 
conflict in the text of the Digest. Unraveling that conflict involved an 
excursion into the development of Roman law, the way in which texts 
were preserved and how the Digest was constructed. This exploration 
concludes that the conflict resulted from the failure of the Roman jurists 
to engage in just such an historical study. Instead, they tried to explain 
the law on liability by extrapolations from other legal principles. This 
abstract ahistorical reasoning produced confident statements of directly 
opposite propositions on an undecided point, resulting in total confusion 
in the Digest. 
The power to reject customers is not a good reason for imposing 
strict liability. The mistaken rationale in the Digest could have 
discouraged the imposition of a duty to serve the public by fostering 
a belief that a duty to serve the public requires lowering liability 
standards. Similarly, the attribution offault to the operator of a business 
in selecting employees could have preserved a penalty beyond its useful 
period. The division and dissolution of the Roman empire, however, 
prevented any further immediate development along these lines. 
· This article not only points to the problems of ignoring history 
in dealing with current issues, but it begins in one small area the process 
of looking at historical development. The common law principle that 
hotels, restaurants and common carriers have a status-based 
responsibility to the public has been an important element in the 
development of race relations law in the United States. 119 The Romans 
probably would have decided in favor of the innkeeper's right to exclude 
travelers from the inn. Although similarities between the common law 
and Roman law can lead the scholar to find common sources for 
119. See Note, "The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law," 102 Harv. 
L Rev. 1993 (1989); Randall Kennedy, "Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal 
History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott," 98 Yale L J. 999 (1989); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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obligations, here it is the differences that provide insight. I2o Roman 
law reveals that the obligation of the innkeeper or the common carrier 
to serve the public is not necessarily an integral part of their status. 
The law may impose strict liability on innkeepers or carriers for loss 
or damage of their customers' goods without requiring them to accept 
all comers. Thus, the development of a common law obligation to serve 
the public does not come from any universal principle, but it is rooted 
in English experience during the middle ages where it first saw the . 
light of day. 
120. When Sir William Jones wrote his treatise on bailments in the eighteenth century, 
he proposed to illustrate English law by a comparison with foreign law. William Jones, 
An Essay on the Law of Bailments, Classics of English Legal History in the Modem 
Era (London: C. Dilly, 1781 reprinted New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) p. 
3. He contended that "a perfect harmony subsists on this interesting branch of jurisprudence 
in the codes of nations most eminent for legal wisdom, particularly of the ROMANS 
and the ENGLISH." /d. at II. "What is good sense in one age," he remarked, "must 
be good sense, all circumstances remaining, in another." /d. at 14. 
Several authors made the mistake of reading Jones' comments on the coincidence 
of Roman law and English law as a statement that Roman law was the basis for English 
law on bailments, including innkeepers. Radin, supra note 90 at 254; William L. Burdick, 
The Principles of Roman Law (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., 
1938) p. 55. Justice Story also pointed to the Roman Law which made the innkeeper 
liable for goods delivered to his keeping as the source of the common law of innkeeper 
liability. J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments (5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown 
Co., 1851) pp. 489-95. Indeed, Lord Holt in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 909, 92 
E.R. 107 (1703), analyzed the law of bailments based on Bracton [Henry de Bracton, 
On the Laws and Customs of England (4 vols.; Samuel Thome, ed.,) 2:284-85.] who 
in tum drew from Roman law. See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of 
the Common Law (5th edition; Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956) p. 264. Whether 
English law on innkeepers was influenced by Roman law remains controversial: its main 
features predate Holt's use of Bracton. At the least, Roman law illustrates some of the 
legal issues involving innkeepers and provides a basis for comparison which assists in 
understanding why English law developed as it did. 
